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20 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

In the course of the opinion in the principal case, the court
suggests, obiter, that if the county had discovered the mistake before
payment of the warrant to McGrath, and had refused to pay more
than the amount for which the warrant should have been drawn, it
would have had a good defense, pro tanto, in an action to recover
the face value of the warrant. If Robertson were still solvent this
would be true. But the court seems to imply that even if Robertson were insolvent the same result would follow. This, it is submitted, is inconsistent with the result reached in the actual case. In
defending an action on the warrant, the county would have to ask
the court, in effect, to rectify the mistake in the amount for which
the warrant was drawn. And such a rectification of the warrant,
before payment, would shift the loss from the county to McGrath
just as effectually as would a judgment for the county, after payment-and just as inequitably.
FREDERIC C. WOODWARD.
TRADE NAME-RIGHT TO EXCLUSIVE USE AFTER PERMITTING
ITS USE BY OTHERS.- [Federal] In a recent federal case in Colorado' the plaintiff corporation brought suit to enjoin the use of a

certain corporate name, claiming that it was its trade name. The
plaintiff had been in business for many years, as an employment
agency for teachers. It itself had only a few offices, but in many
cities there were separate individuals conducting a similar business,
with whom the plaintiff had contract connections. By these contracts the plaintiff permitted them to call themselves "Fisk Teachers' Agency," supplied them with stationery and office supplies, and
included them in all the advertising done by it (which was extensive). In return each local office agreed to subject itself to the
plaintiff's directions in its relations with other Fisk offices and to
pay to the plaintiff a share of its earnings. The.defendant, M. E.
Shuck, operated a local office under such an agreement. During the
lifetime of this agreement he refused any longer to be bound by it,
and organized the defendant corporation as a competing business
under the name of the Fisk Teachers' Agency, Inc. The plaintiff's
bill having been dismissed, the present court affirmed the decision.
The opinion first states that "a trade name cannot be assigned, except as an incident to the sale of the business and good-will in connection with which it has been used," and that therefore its use
cannot be licensed to others. It then states that such use of the
name, being under such an ineffective license, has caused it to lose
all its distinctiveness as connected with the plaintiff. The remainder
of the opinion expounds the law governing situations where the
owner of a trade name has freely allowed all others to use it and
has himself ceased to do so-all of it wholly obiter and in no wise
called for by the present case, where the only users were persons
with whom contracts had been made and where the plaintiff was
1. Everett 0. Fisk & Co., Inc. v. Fisk Teachers? Agency, Inc. (1924)

3 F. (2d) 7.
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active not only in using the name itself but also in prosecuting an
alleged infringement.
No doubt the proposition is true that if the owner of a trademark or a trade name were to 'sell' to some other person the bare
right to use that mark or name, without a sale of anything else,
either tangible or intangible (such as his good-will, on going out of
business himself), such an attempted sale would be of no effect at
all. To uphold it would be directly to aid a fraud on the public
who are induced by the mark or name to believe that they are buying the product of one who in fact no longer has anything to do
with the product. It is a species of palming off the goods of one
man as being those of another, differing from the ordinary instances
of such palming off only in the fact that the person whose product
they purport to be is himself allied to the falsifier, and not a victim. 2
It would seem to be equally true that where, instead of having a
complete assignment of mark or name, we find a bare license to
use it for a time, the same result would follow. So long as the
license exists the palming off process would be precisely the same,
and the objections, if fatal to the assignment, ought to be fatal to
'its more modest twin.3 " The sale or license being wholly ineffective,
it may well be that the name or mark is entirely lost, so far as exclusive rights are concerned, since the users can assert that they
have actually been doing nothing better than pirating it. On the
other hand, it is also obviously true that where an entire business
or good-will is sold, the exclusive use of a trade name may be sold
also.4 It is likewise the case that where there has been a partial
sale of the business-partial either as to extent of territory involved
or as to the limited time during which the 'buyer' is to be permitted
to carry on the business-the exclusive use of the trade name may
be apportioned in the same manner as is the business which it characterizes. 5 This was forcefully shown in Adam v. Foqere in which
Folger permitted Adam to manufacture certain heaters under the
former's patent and to call them by the trade name "Victor." The
license was terminable at Folger's wish and was terminated by him.
It was held that the right to use the trade name was thereby also
terminated.7 A case even more like the principal one arose in Cali2. So far as the cases cited in the opinion are in point at all, it is this
proposition that they establish.
3. Lea v. New Home Sewing Machine Co. (1905) 139 Fed. 732.
4. Kidd v. Johnson (1879) 100 U5. S. 617; Brewer v. Lamar (1882) 69
Ga. 656.
5. Batcheller v. Thomson (1899) 93 Fed. 660.

6. (1903) 120 Fed. 260.

7. Other cases to the same effect are Elliott Varnish Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1915) 221 Fed. 797; American Thermos Bottle Co. v. Grant
(1922) 282 Fed. 426, affirming 279 Fed. 151; Hoffman v. Kuppenheimer &

Co. (1910) 183 Fed. 597 ("If, then, the right to use the trade name may

be assigned as an incident to a license to manufacture and sell under a patent,
without prejudice to the interest of the assignor in the trade name, except
as affected by the terms of the assignment, manifestly the defendants, having lost all rights under the assignment, may no longer use the trade name or
mark and complainants have become reinvested with full title"); Waterproofing Co. v. Hydrolithic Cement Co. (1912) 138 N. Y. Supp. 265 ("If
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fornia, where the complainant was conducting a state-wide fur
business under a trade name. He permitted the defendant, his
brother, to open a retail store in one city under that name. It was
held that on withdrawal of the license to use the name its exclusive
use once more became the property of the complainant, and that the
defendant, who had meanwhile incorporated under that name, should
be enjoined from using it.
It is true then that permitting another to use one's trade name
does not necessarily open the flood gates and involve a helplessness
thereafter to protest against any use of it by others. It depends on
the situation in which the question is raised, and whether or not the
user is employing it in a manner merely ancillary to the business
which he has permanently or temporarily taken over from the owner.
Applying this reasoning to the instant facts, the plaintiff did turn
over to independent persons the business to be done in a certain
territory for a specified period of years. That each such person
might be safe from opposition in his territory it required of each
one that he submit to its decision all questions covering his relationship with other offices. Even in the details of office management
the plaintiff exercised a detailed supervision, and its close interest in
each branch business was cemented by the requirement that it was
to do all the advertising for the entire chain, featuring each member
alike. For all of this it was to receive a definite proportion of the
cash receipts. There was by no means a mere sale of a trade name
in gross, but an involved apportionment of business between closely
allied parties to which the use of the name was simply ancillary,
and to the continuation of which it was sharply limited. This relation having ceased, all the rights derived from it, whether the use
of the name or any others, ceased also.
Taking this view, discussion is necessary as to a point which
under the view adopted by the principal case need not be considered.
Equity will not lend its aid where the complainant is using such a
trade name as will deceive or defraud the public. It will not by its
aid give to one person the exclusive privilege to practice such a
fraud. Were the plaintiff's advertisements listing all the offices,
without any indication that they were not owned by it, such a fraud
as to disentitle it to relief ? -Before examining the question it might
be said that such solicitude for the public comes with bad grace
from the defendant, who certainly had no connection any longer
with any Fisk and who could only have been induced to adopt that
name because of his shrewd appreciation of the conclusions which a
mistaken public would draw from it. That the alleged wrongdoing
of one person justifies the similar wrongdoing of another is a doctrine always more appealing to the second wrongdoer than to the
impartial outsider. But the question remains whether there had
been any material misrepresentation by the plaintiff. It would seem
Winslow merely licensed the company to use 'Hydrolithic' in connection with
selling cement manufactured pursuant to his secret formula, then on the
termination of the license he would have the right to resume the use of both
formula and trade-mark or trade name").
8. Benioff v. Benioff (1923 D. C. of App., Cal.) 222 Pac. 835.
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to be far from certain that the mere listing of the branch offices was
a representation that they were all alike owned by the advertiser.
The connection might well have been much more limited.
Thus in Nelson v. Winchell & Coinpany9 a jobber in shoes advertised a special brand of his own. He did not manufacture them
himself, but had this done for him. It was held that the use of a
trade-mark did not constitute a representation that the product was
the sole creation of the owner of the mark, but simply that the
owner of the mark stood back of it with whatever trade reputation
he might have. 10 In the same manner here the reader of the advertisement would have no reason to form any opinion one way or the
other on the fact-wholly immaterial to him-as to who was or
were the owners of each branch. What he would be entitled to
infer was that back of each stood whatever of service and reputation had come to be associated with the trade name of Fisk. Instances might readily be cited where the person dealing with a
branch house would be greatly interested in the question of its
ownership and its financial connection with the central office, as,
for example, where he was called on to rely largely on its credit and
financial stability. In such a case an advertisement failing to announce the separate nature of the branches might well be characterized as fraudulent. Sucla, however, was not the case here.
Clients were as well served by a series of allied but separately owned
offices as they would have been by one centrally owned. The matter
of ownership was immaterial to them, and it would be a strange
doctrine which required the disclosure not only of material facts
but of immaterial ones as well. The case unfortunately presents a
particularly clear instance of the denial of justice to an injured

party.

E. W. PUTTKAMMER.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DiSABILITY-Loss OF A MEMBER
The recent case of Sykes Co. v. Industrial Com.' involved the question whether or not an employee who
suffered an injury to the hand that left only the thumb and the
palm of the hand denuded of all the fingers had thereby sustained
the complete loss of the use of the hand. The Industrial Commission in making its award, and the Circuit Court in sustaining it,
apparently proceeded on the authority of an earlier case on this
point in this state2 where the injury resulted in a loss of all the
fingers except the index finger, which, however, was left so badly
crushed as to cause it to be bent inward and to be stiff and always
painful. The thumb was not injured, but the palm of the hand was
in an impaired condition, being left more hollow than the other
hand. It was possible to use the hand to pick up small articles, to
OF THE BODY.-[Illinois]

9. (1909) 203 Mass. 75.
10. See also Hilton v. Hilton (N. J. Eq. 1917) 102 At. 16.
1. (1925) 314 Ill. 326.

2. Mark Manf. Co. v. Indust, Cow. 286 I11. 620.

